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4                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
POLLAK, District Judge
Plaintiffs – two New Jersey wine enthusiasts, a New
Jersey couple who seeks access to more Kosher wines, and a
California winery – have brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey against Jerry
Fischer, New Jersey’s Director of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
alleging that several aspects of New Jersey’s Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law (“ABC Law”) infringe on the dormant
Commerce Clause in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
I.
New Jersey law, like the laws of many states,
establishes a “three-tier” structure for alcohol distribution and
sales.  Pursuant to that structure, alcoholic beverages are sold
by (1) suppliers and manufacturers to (2) wholesalers, who in
turn sell to (3) retailers, who then sell alcohol to consumers. 
5In Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the view expressed by five justices in North
Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990), that such a
“three-tier system . . . is ‘unquestionably legitimate.’”
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (citing North Dakota, 495 U.S. at
432 (plurality op.) & id. at 447 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment)).   The Granholm Court nevertheless cautioned that
“straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local
producers” of alcoholic beverages by, for instance,
“subjecting out-of-state [producers], but not local ones, to the
three-tier system,” are “contrary to the Commerce Clause and
. . . not saved by the [states’ authority to regulate alcoholic
beverages under] the Twenty-first Amendment.”  Id. at 474,
489 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Plaintiffs filed this suit in 2003, contending that five
aspects of New Jersey’s laws regulating wine contravene this
nondiscrimination principle in violation of the dormant
6Commerce Clause.  The first two statutory provisions at issue
involve privileges relating to the sale of wine to consumers
and retailers that are afforded to wineries that obtain New
Jersey plenary or farm winery licenses, but not to wineries
lacking such licenses.  Plenary licenses may be obtained by
producers that “grow[] and cultivat[e] grapes . . . on at least
three acres on, or adjacent to, the winery premises,” but only
if the wine “is produced, blended, fortified, or treated by the
licensee on its licensed premises situated in the State of New
Jersey.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 33:1-10(2a).   Farm winery
licenses, meanwhile, are available to wineries which produce
less than 50,000 gallons of wine per year and which, “for the
first five years of the operation of the winery,” produce wine
that is “from at least 51% grapes or fruit grown in the State”
of New Jersey.  Id. § 33:1-10(2b).  Holders of either type of
license (“in-state wineries”) may sell their wines “at retail to
consumers” at the winery and at “six salesrooms apart from
The statute also provides that “one salesroom1
per county may be jointly controlled and operated by at least
two plenary or farm winery licensees for the sale of the
products of any plenary or farm winery licensee for
consumption on or off the premises.”  N.J. Stat. §§ 33:1-
10(2a) & (2b).  Plaintiffs do not challenge this provision on
appeal.
7
the winery premises.”  Id. §§ 33:1-10(2a) & (2b).   In-state1
wineries are also permitted to sell their wines “to wholesalers
and retailers.”  Id.  Wineries that do not hold either a plenary
or a farm winery license (“out-of-state wineries”), by contrast,
must funnel their wines through the three-tier system by
selling to wholesalers.
Plaintiffs also challenge two aspects of New Jersey’s
rules regarding the personal importation of wine.  N.J. Stat. §
33:1-2(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Alcoholic beverages intended in good faith
solely for personal use may be transported, by
the owner thereof, in a vehicle other than that of
the holder of a transportation license, from a
point outside this State to the extent of . . . one
gallon of wine . . . within any consecutive
While the language of the statute sets the fee at2
$25, see N.J. Stat. § 33:1-2(a), defendant’s certification to the
District Court indicates that the fee is $50.
8
period of 24 hours; provided, however, that
except pursuant to and within the terms of a
license or permit issued by the director, no
person shall transport into this State or receive
from without this State into this State, alcoholic
beverages where the alcoholic beverages are
transported or received from a state which
prohibits the transportation into that state of
alcoholic beverages purchased or otherwise
obtained in the State of New Jersey. If any
person or persons desire to transport alcoholic
beverages intended only for personal use in
quantities in excess of those above-mentioned,
an application may be made to the director who
may, upon being satisfied of the good faith of
the applicant, and upon payment of a fee  . . .2
issue a special permit limited by such conditions
as the director may impose, authorizing the
transportation of alcoholic beverages in
quantities in excess of those above-mentioned.
Plaintiffs challenge both the one-gallon cap on importation
and the reciprocity provision prohibiting importation of wine
from states that bar the entry of New Jersey wine.
Finally, plaintiffs seek to invalidate New Jersey’s ban
9on direct shipments of wine from wineries to consumers via
common carrier.  When plaintiffs filed suit in 2003, the ABC
Law allowed in-state, but not out-of-state, wineries to make
such shipments.  However, in anticipation of Granholm,
which invalidated similar provisions of Michigan and New
York law, the New Jersey legislature rescinded this privilege,
resulting in a ban on all direct shipments of wine from
producers to New Jersey residents.
After three New Jersey wholesalers – Fedway
Associates, R&R Marketing, and Allied Beverage Group –
intervened in the District Court on behalf of the defendant, the
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, contesting
(1) plaintiffs’ standing to sue, and (2) the validity of the above
portions of New Jersey’s ABC Law.  The District Court held
that plaintiffs met the applicable standing requirements, and
that the challenged provisions were largely constitutional. 
Both sides appealed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides “[t]he courts of3
appeals” with jurisdiction over, inter alia, “all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States.”
10
U.S.C. § 1291.3
II.
“Standing implicates both constitutional requirements
and prudential concerns.”  Common Cause of Pa. v.
Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Constitutional standing, which should be considered “before
examining issues of prudential standing,” Joint Stock Soc’y v.
UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 2001), includes
three well-known elements: 
“(1) an injury in fact (i.e., a concrete and
particularized invasion of a legally protected
interest); (2) causation (i.e., a fairly traceable
connection between the alleged injury in fact
and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and
(3) redressability (i.e., it is likely and not merely
speculative that the plaintiff’s injury will be
remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing
suit).”
11
Common Cause of Pa., 558 F.3d at 258 (quoting Sprint
Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2535
(2008)).  “‘The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing these elements,’” and, on summary
judgment, “the plaintiff cannot rely on mere allegations ‘but
must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts’”
demonstrating that these requirements have been met.  Joint
Stock Soc’y, 266 F.3d at 175 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
An injury-in-fact must be “a palpable and distinct
harm” that, even if “widely shared,” “‘must affect the plaintiff
in a personal and individual way.’”  Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of
Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Defenders of Wildlife, 555 U.S. at 560 n.1).  The causation
prong then “focuses on who inflicted [the] harm.”  Id. at 142. 
While “[t]he plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s
12
challenged actions, not the actions of some third party, caused
the plaintiff’s injury,” “[t]his causal connection need not be as
close as the proximate causation needed to succeed on the
merits of a tort claim,” and “an indirect causal relationship
will suffice.”  Id.  Finally, the redressability prong “looks
forward” to determine whether “‘the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.’”  Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). 
“Redressability is not a demand for mathematical certainty,”
but it does require “a ‘substantial likelihood’” that the injury
in fact can be remedied by a judicial decision.  Id. at 143
(quoting Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000)).
“The requirements of prudential standing,” meanwhile,
“serve ‘to avoid deciding questions of broad social import
where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit
access to the federal courts to those best suited to assert a
13
particular claim.’”  Joint Stock Soc’y, 266 F.3d at 179
(quoting Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50,
Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998)).  Prudential standing 
“require[s] that (1) a litigant assert his [or her]
own legal interests rather than those of third
parties, (2) courts refrain from adjudicating
abstract questions of wide public significance
which amount to generalized grievances, and (3)
a litigant demonstrate that her interests are
arguably within the zone of interests intended to
be protected by the statute, rule, or constitutional
provision on which the claim is based.”
Oxford Assocs. v. Waste Sys. Auth. of E. Montgomery County,
271 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Davis v. Phila.
Hous. Auth., 121 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1997)) (emphasis
omitted).  Although “the zone of interests ‘test denies a right
of review if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related
to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that
it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to
permit the suit,’” “‘[t]he test is not meant to be especially
demanding.’”  Davis, 121 F.3d at 98 (quoting Clarke v. Secs.
14
Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987)). 
A.
We first consider whether plaintiffs Robert and Judy
Freeman have standing to sue.  The Freemans describe
themselves as “wine collectors” and “home winemakers” who
travel to the west coast several times each year in order to
visit wineries.  They allege that the ABC Law has prevented
them from obtaining several wines they would like to drink,
but which are unavailable in New Jersey stores.  The
Freemans state that they would ideally like to receive direct
shipments from wineries, but they also assert that (1) New
Jersey law allows them to buy in-state, but not out-of-state,
wines directly from producers at wineries and storefronts, and
(2) traveling to distant wineries in order to return with small
quantities of wine is highly impracticable.
(1)
The Freemans argue that they are unable to obtain
15
wines that they desire via interstate commerce.  In addressing
the same argument, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that
when “plaintiffs want to drink [wines that] are not carried by
[in-state] resellers” and are prevented from otherwise
obtaining those wines by state law, they have “establishe[d]
injury in fact.”  Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d
848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000); accord Baude v. Heath, No. 05-cv-
735, 2007 WL 2479587, at *7-*8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 29, 2007),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008);
Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601-
607-08 (W.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Cherry Hill
Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008).  We
agree.  The Freemans are directly constrained by the
provisions of the ABC Law preventing the importation of (1)
more than a gallon of out-of-state wine without a special
permit, and (2) any wine from states that prohibit the
importation of New Jersey wines.  Moreover, although the
16
Freemans are “not in the business of selling alcoholic
beverages and therefore could not violate” the other statutory
provisions at issue “if they tried,” Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at
847, “cognizable injury from unconstitutional discrimination
against interstate commerce does not stop at members of the
class against whom a State ultimately discriminates,” Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 286 (1997).  Rather,
“customers of that class may also be injured.”  Id.  As a result,
the Freemans – who allege that New Jersey law discriminates
against the out-of-state wineries of which they are customers
– have suffered an injury in fact.
The question then becomes whether the Freemans’
injury is fairly traceable to the statutes at issue.  As an initial
matter, we reject defendant’s contention that the traceability
prong is not met because New Jersey’s statutory scheme does
not, in fact, offend the dormant Commerce Clause. 
“‘Standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s
17
contention that the particular conduct is illegal . . . .’”  Marion
v. TDI, Inc., 591 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).  The question for
purposes of the traceability prong is not whether the ABC
Law is unconstitutionally discriminatory, but rather whether,
be it even-handed and constitutional or not, it is causally
connected to plaintiffs’ injury in fact.  We thus consider
whether plaintiffs have presented evidence that each of the
challenged provisions impedes their ability to purchase wine
in interstate commerce.
The first two of plaintiffs’ challenges are to provisions
of New Jersey law that effectively allow in-state wineries to
sell directly to consumers and retailers, but forbid out-of-state
wineries from engaging in sales to anyone but wholesalers.
The question as to traceability is whether these provisions
exclude wine from New Jersey that would otherwise appear
on the market, thereby limiting the number of out-of-state
For example, Edward O’Keefe, Sr., the owner4
of Chateau Grand Traverste, a Michigan winery, stated the
following: “Our winery does not currently have a distributor
in New Jersey.  If we were to obtain a distributor, we would
be forced to give up approximately 40-50% of our profits to
the distributor.  Our business model is based on both sales out
of the tasting room, use of distributors in specific states, and
direct shipment.  It is our experience that direct sales to the
consumer either at the tasting room or through delivery by
common carrier is the most profitable to us.”  JA 222
18
wines that the Freemans may purchase.  Cutting against the
view that the Freemans are traceably injured by their resultant
inability to purchase a wide array of out-of-state wines is the
fact that the record does not clearly establish that any out-of-
state wineries would, but for the statute, open retail sales
rooms in New Jersey.  Pointing in the other direction is record
evidence that many out-of-state wineries have attempted,
without success, to interest New Jersey wholesalers in their
wines, and that other out-of-state wineries will not try either
to (1) enter the three-tier system via a wholesaler, because
doing do so would cut deeply into profits,  or (2) obtain their4
(O’Keefe affidavit ¶¶ 9-13) (numbering omitted).
Defendant and intervenors attempt to resist this5
conclusion by arguing that the state has never enforced the
transportation restrictions when individuals import wine
intended for personal use.  We reject this argument, because
19
own wholesaler license, which can be prohibitively expensive. 
Plaintiffs, in other words, have presented evidence that
numerous out-of-state wineries have, without success, sought
alternative ways to enter the New Jersey marketplace.  We
conclude that, taken in the aggregate, this evidence suffices to
show that part of plaintiffs’ injury is traceable to New Jersey’s
choice to deny out-of-state wineries the ability to sell directly
both to retailers and to consumers.
Plaintiffs have also presented evidence that they would
return from their winery trips with more wine if New Jersey
law so allowed.  Accordingly, part of their inability to buy
certain wines may be traced to the transportation restrictions
in the ABC Law.   And there is little question that the5
defendant has not presented any official, binding assurance
that the statute will not be enforced as written.  Moreover, we
note that the ABC Law has been repeatedly amended by the
legislature without any alteration of the transportation
restrictions, a fact which suggests that, whatever defendant’s
current practice regarding the statute, the New Jersey
legislature intends for it to be enforced.
20
Freemans’ injury partially traces to the direct shipment ban. 
They have attempted to order wine shipments from at least
five out-of-state wineries, each of which has refused to make
the shipments.  Plaintiffs have also presented evidence, both
drawn from their own experience and in the form of a Federal
Trade Commission report, that a sizeable number of wineries
sell their wine exclusively via direct shipment.  Taken
together, this evidence is more than adequate to demonstrate
that there is a “fairly traceable connection between the alleged
injury in fact and” the direct shipment ban.  Toll Bros., 555
F.3d at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The same evidence that demonstrates causation
Intervenors argue that the redressability prong is6
not met as to the direct shipment ban because all wineries are
prohibited from making direct shipments, meaning that
invalidating the ban would necessarily entail the creation of
new rights.  But assuming that plaintiffs are correct in their
argument that the direct shipment ban disproportionately
affects out-of-state wineries, striking down the ban would do
no more than vindicate the well-recognized rule that state
laws may not discriminatorily favor intrastate commerce over
interstate commerce.
21
suffices, in this case, to demonstrate redressability: Removing
the restrictions placed by the ABC Law on consumers and
out-of-state wineries would, on this record, lead to greater
availability of a greater number of wines that plaintiffs wish
to purchase.6
(2)
The Freemans also have prudential standing to challenge
the statutory provisions at issue.  While defendant argues that
the Freemans, who knew plaintiffs’ counsel in this case before
it was filed, are thereby without a personal stake in its outcome,
there is no evidence that the Freemans’ œnophilia, upon which
22
their standing is grounded, is anything but sincere, or that they
are actually attempting to litigate an interest held by their
attorneys.  Similarly, there is no indication that the Freemans
have come to court with a generalized grievance; their injury as
wine enthusiasts who wish to purchase certain wines is a highly
particularized one.  
The remaining question as to the Freemans, then, is
whether or not they fall within the “zone of interests” protected
by the dormant Commerce Clause.  Insofar as the regulations
“directly affect[]” the Freemans as individuals “participating in
commerce,” they have standing to redress “their dormant
Commerce Clause right to access interstate markets.”  Oxford
Assocs., 271 F.3d at 148.  The Freemans may accordingly
proceed with their challenge to the importation restrictions,
which directly regulate their participation in interstate
commerce.  
The other provisions, by contrast, directly regulate
It is arguable that consumers are also directly7
regulated by the direct shipment ban, but we will assume,
arguendo, that they are not.
23
producers, not consumers,  and we have not previously7
addressed  the issue of whether dormant Commerce Clause
plaintiffs have prudential standing when they are not directly
regulated by the statute at issue.  See id. at 148 n.4 (reserving
this question).  We now hold that such plaintiffs can come
within the zone of interests if their "ability to freely contract
with out-of-state companies was directly infringed by local
regulation."  Id. at 149 (Barry, J., dissenting).  We adopt this
rule because such plaintiffs seek to vindicate interests related to
the protection of interstate commerce.  In particular, plaintiffs
who seek to protect “the right as a consumer to purchase . . .
services across State boundaries” assert interests closely related
to the purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause.  Huish
Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, 214 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir.
24
2000).  See also, Oehrleins, Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter
v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372, 1381 (8th Cir. 1997)
(suggesting that standing is appropriate where plaintiffs “s[eek]
to protect their own rights to purchase goods or do business
across state borders”).  By contrast, plaintiffs are without
prudential standing if their interest is unrelated to the asserted
“barrier to interstate commerce.”  On the Green Apartments
L.L.C. v. City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  For instance, plaintiffs who
“allege only that a party with whom they contract is subject to
an undue burden on its ability to freely participate in interstate
commerce” are not within the zone of interests protected by the
dormant Commerce Clause.  Oxford Associates, 271 F.3d at 149
(Barry, J., dissenting).  Neither are plaintiffs whose interest is
merely one in avoiding a passed-on fee or cost.  See Individuals
for Responsible Gov’t, Inc. v. Washoe County, 110 F.3d 699,
703 (9th Cir. 1997); Oehrleins, 115 F.3d at 1380; see also, e.g.
25
City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern, 581 F.3d 841, 848 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“As the name implies, the zone of interest test turns
on the interest sought to be protected, not the harm suffered by
the plaintiff.”).
In challenging the prohibitions on direct sales by out-of-
state wineries and the direct shipment ban, the Freemans present
themselves as in-state consumers wishing to access out-of-state
products.  Their interest in overturning these features of New
Jersey law therefore dovetails with the commerce-protective
purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause.  The Freemans
accordingly satisfy the zone-of-interest test as to all of the
challenged provisions of the ABC Law.
B.
“[T]he presence of one plaintiff with standing is
sufficient to satisfy that requirement.”  Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 228 n.7 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986)),
26
rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).  Accordingly,
having concluded that the Freemans possess both constitutional
and prudential standing to raise all of the claims at issue, we do
not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs.
III.
“The dormant Commerce Clause ‘prohibits the states
from imposing restrictions that benefit in-state economic
interests at out-of-state interests’ expense, thus reinforcing the
principle of the unitary national market.’”  Am. Trucking Ass’ns
v. Whitman, 437 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd.,
298 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  The clause “therefore prohibits a state from impeding
free market forces to shield in-state businesses from out-of-state
competition.”  Id.
Any statute that “discriminates against interstate
commerce on its face or in effect” is thus “subject to heightened
27
scrutiny.”  Id. at 319.  “The party challenging the statute has the
burden of proving” that the statute is discriminatory,
Cloverland-Green Spring-Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd.,
462 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Cloverland II”), but if the
plaintiff meets that burden, “the State must demonstrate (1) that
the statute serves a legitimate local interest, and (2) that this
purpose could not be served as well by available non-
discriminatory means,” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 437 F.3d at 319.
If the plaintiff does not meet its burden of showing that the
statute is discriminatory, we instead use “the balancing test set
forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), to
determine whether the burdens on interstate commerce
substantially outweigh[] the putative local benefits.”  Cloverland
II, 462 F.3d at 258.
Historically, courts have struggled with the question of
to what extent the dormant Commerce Clause applies in the
context of alcoholic beverage restrictions, given the broad
Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment8
provides that “[t]he transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”
28
regulatory authority granted to states by section 2 of the Twenty-
First Amendment.   In Granholm, however, the Supreme Court8
reiterated that dormant Commerce Clause principles apply in the
context of regulations on the shipment of wine.  In fact, in the
Court’s view, it is “essential to the foundations of the Union”
that “in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate
the Commerce Clause if they mandate ‘differential treatment of
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
former and burdens the latter.’”  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472
(quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or.,
511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).  Thus, the Court held that “Section 2
does not allow States to regulate the direct shipment of wine on
terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers,” id. at 476,
29
and that “straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of
local producers” are “not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment,” id. at 489.  As a result, unless the state “show[s]
that ‘the discrimination is demonstrably justified,’” statutes
regulating alcohol that discriminate against interstate commerce
must be invalidated.  Id. at 492 (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992)).  The Granholm Court,
however, also held that “the three-tier system itself is
‘unquestionably legitimate,’” and that “[s]tate policies are
protected under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat
liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic
equivalent.”  Id. at 489 (quoting North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432).
A.
We first consider plaintiffs’ challenges to the statutory
provisions allowing only in-state wineries to sell directly to
retailers and consumers.
(1)
30
In Granholm, the Supreme Court clarified that “[t]he
mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in
one State from access to markets in other States.”  544 U.S. at
472.  In particular, when “all out-of-state wine, but not all in-
state wine, [must] pass through an in-state wholesaler and
retailer before reaching consumers,” “[t]he discriminatory
character of a system is obvious.”  Id. at 473-74.  Thus, direct
and indirect methods “of subjecting out-of-state wineries, but
not local ones, to the three-tier system” contravene the
dormant Commerce Clause.  Id. at 474.
The ABC Law violates this rule by allowing in-state,
but not out-of-state, wineries to sell directly to consumers.  In-
state wineries are thereby allowed to skip the first two tiers –
wholesalers and retailers – while out-of-state wineries must
involve both of these tiers in order for their wine to reach
consumers.  Accordingly, these aspects of the ABC Law are
subject to strict scrutiny as discriminatory on their face.
31
Defendant and intervenors raise three arguments to the
contrary, none of which is persuasive.  First, defendant argues
that, because each location at which an in-state winery sells
wine is considered to be a part of the winery premises, all sales
are technically “on-premises” – meaning that the law is non-
discriminatory, because, by definition, only New Jersey wineries
have premises in New Jersey.  This transparent attempt at
obfuscation is, however, squarely at odds with the statutory
language allowing in-state wineries to sell wines “in six
salesrooms apart from the winery premises.”  N.J. Stat. §§ 33:1-
10(2a) & (2b) (emphasis supplied).  
Second, defendant and intervenors asseverate that the law
is non-discriminatory because out-of-state wineries may sell
directly to consumers on their own premises in their home states.
This argument misconceives the demands of the dormant
Commerce Clause.  The dormant Commerce Clause does not
protect the rights of all wineries to engage in the  same form of
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commerce; it prohibits states from treating in-state-wineries
differently from out-of-state wineries.  See, e.g., Granholm, 544
U.S. at 472.  Because this regulation mandates differential
treatment, it is discriminatory, even if the wineries are, in some
sense, competing on an equal footing. 
Finally, intervenors argue that Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC
v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007), which upheld
privileges given by Maine to small wineries against a Commerce
Clause challenge, should persuade us to uphold the direct-sale
provisions of the ABC Law.  The statute in Baldacci, however,
made “[f]arm winery licenses . . . available on equal terms to in-
state and out-of-state vineyards alike.”  Id. at 36.  In fact, the
Baldacci court explained that this aspect of the Maine law was
what protected it from the charge that it “explicitly
discriminate[s] against interstate commerce.”  Id.  Because New
Jersey allows only in-state wineries to sell directly to consumers,
precisely this
The District Court partially upheld the direct-9
sale provisions on the ground that out-of-state wineries could
obtain wholesaler licenses that would allow them to sell wine
directly to consumers.  Both plaintiffs and defendant argue
that this interpretation of the ABC Law is flawed, and we
agree.  In keeping with the three-tier structure, wholesale
licenses only allow the licensee to sell “to wholesalers and
retailers,” not to consumers.  N.J. Stat. §§ 33:1-11(2a) & (2b).
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equal-handedness is absent from the direct-sales provisions of
the ABC Law.  Baldacci supports our view that the direct-sale
provisions of the ABC Law are facially discriminatory.9
(2)
New Jersey law also authorizes in-state wineries to
bypass wholesalers and sell directly to retailers.  This privilege
again allows in-state, but not out-of-state, wineries to
circumvent portions of the three-tier system.  As a result, it, too,
is facially discriminatory against interstate commerce.
Contrary to the District Court’s conclusion, the
discriminatory character of these provisions would not be cured
by allowing out-of-state wineries to become licensed
While upholding the provisions allowing in-10
state-wineries, but not out-of-state wineries, to sell directly to
retailers, the District Court invalidated New Jersey’s fee
schedule for retail and wholesale licenses on the ground that
wholesale licenses – the only type available to out-of-state
wineries – are more expensive.  In light of our conclusion that
the relevant portions of the statute (§§ 33:1-10(2a) and (2b))
are not saved by the ability of out-of-state wineries to obtain
wholesale licenses, we need not reach this issue.
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wholesalers.   Assuming, arguendo, that an out-of-state winery10
may, under New Jersey law, eliminate the use of third-party
wholesalers by purchasing such a license, any winery purchasing
a wholesale license would nevertheless, unlike in-state
producers, be forced to proceed through each of the tiers of the
three-tier system.  Moreover, a wholesaling license comes at a
higher cost than a winery license, and with a different bundle of
privileges – many of which a winery seeking only to sell its own
products to retailers would not use.  In short, this path is simply
an “indirect way of subjecting out-of-state wineries . . . to the
three-tier system,” Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474, and the
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provisions allowing in-state, but not out-of-state, wineries to sell
directly to retailers without using a wholesaler are therefore
discriminatory.
(3)
Neither defendant nor intervenors attempts to save the
provisions of the ABC Law allowing in-state wineries to make
direct sales to consumers and retailers by arguing that they are
necessary to serve some legitimate local purpose.  Accordingly,
we hold that these portions of the ABC Law violate the dormant
Commerce Clause.
B.
As discussed above, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 33:1-2(a) caps the
importation of out-of-state wine for personal use at one gallon
unless the importing individual secures a special permit.  Absent
such a permit, the statute also bans the importation of any
alcoholic beverages from states that refuse to allow individuals
to enter with alcohol from New Jersey.  Plaintiffs again argue
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that these provisions facially discriminate against interstate
commerce.
(1)
No party contends that the one-gallon cap on the
importation of out-of-state wine is facially non-discriminatory,
and that provision does, in fact, treat in-state and out-of-state
wine differently in a way that harms interstate commerce.
Specifically, the requirements that any individual seeking to
enter New Jersey with a greater amount of wine (1) apply for a
special permit, and (2) pay a fee for the permit, directly burden
interstate, but not intrastate, commerce.  Moreover, since New
Jersey wineries are currently able to sell unlimited quantities of
wine to residents, this provision operates to limit the amount of
out-of-state, but not in-state, wine that may circumvent the
three-tier system.  Accordingly, this provision is also subject to
Our holding in this regard is not contrary to the11
Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341
(4th Cir. 2006).  The Fourth Circuit did not address the
Brooks plaintiffs’ argument that Virginia’s similar one-gallon
importation limit was unconstitutional, instead holding that
the issue was rendered moot by the Virginia legislature’s
decision to prevent in-state wineries from making direct sales
to consumers.  See id. at 349-50. 
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strict scrutiny.11
Defendant nevertheless argues that the permit
requirement serves local purposes that would not be as well
served by non-discriminatory legislation.  In particular, Fischer
adopts the District Court’s conclusion that “the . . . special
permit serves as a registration mechanism, providing the state
the authority to keep track of on-premises interstate sales for the
purposes of taxation and, to a much lesser extent, to prohibit
illegal activity.”  Freeman v. Fischer, 563 F. Supp. 2d 493, 504
(D.N.J. 2008).  But the District Court, which apparently raised
these issues sua sponte, cites to no evidence in the record for
this proposition.  Neither does Fischer, and our independent
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review of the record has not uncovered any evidence to support
the notion that the permit serves local interests in tracking sales
and squelching illegal activity.  This absence of evidence is
dispositive, because “[t]he burden is on the State to show that
the discrimination is demonstrably justified,” and we may
“uph[o]ld state regulations that discriminate against interstate
commerce only after finding, based on concrete record evidence,
that a state’s nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove
unworkable.”  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492-93 (emphases
supplied and omitted and internal quotation marks omitted).
The District Court’s unsupported assertion does not “satisf[y]
this exacting standard,” id. at 493, and we accordingly hold that
the permit requirement violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
(2)
The reciprocity provision of § 33:1-2(a) also facially
discriminates against interstate commerce.  As with the permit
fee, the reciprocity requirement prevents certain wine – in this
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case, wine from specified jurisdictions – from entering the state
outside the strictures of the three-tier system, while local
winemakers are free to sell as much wine as they can directly to
New Jersey residents.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court has
noted, reciprocity provisions like New Jersey’s “risk[]
generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances and
exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the
Commerce Clause were designed to avoid.”  Granholm, 544
U.S. at 473.
The District Court nonetheless held that the reciprocity
provision is constitutional because defendant interprets it not to
apply to wine imported for personal use.  “When considering a
facial challenge to a state law, ‘a federal court must, of course,
consider any limiting construction that a state court or
enforcement agency has proffered.’”  Brown v. City of
Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 274 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Vill. of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
40
489, 494 n.5 (1982)).  But we will only adopt a proffered
limiting construction when the statute is actually “susceptible to
a construction that avoids constitutional difficulties.”  Brown,
586 F.3d at 275.  In this case, defendant’s narrowing
interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.
The statute provides in part that 
[a]lcoholic beverages intended in good faith
solely for personal use may be transported, by the
owner thereof . . . from a point outside this State
to the extent of . . . one gallon of wine . . . within
any consecutive period of 24 hours; provided,
however, that except pursuant to and within the
terms of a license or permit issued by the director,
no person shall transport into this State or receive
from without this State into this State, alcoholic
beverages where the alcoholic beverages are
transported or received from a state which
prohibits the transportation into that state of
alcoholic beverages purchased or otherwise
obtained in the State of New Jersey.
N.J. Stat. § 33:1-2(a).  The reciprocity provision is thus a
prohibitory exception from the rule delineating the quantities of
alcohol that may otherwise be imported for personal use.  As a
In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue that the ban12
only applies to out-of-state wineries, because N.J. Stat. §
33:1-28 provides that “[l]icensees . . . may transport alcoholic
beverages in their own vehicles, solely, however, for their
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result, the provision cannot be read to contain an exception
allowing importation for personal use, because to imply that
exception would read the reciprocity clause out of the statute
entirely.  We therefore reject defendant’s limiting interpretation
and subject the reciprocity provision to strict scrutiny.
As with the provisions regarding sales to consumers and
retailers, no party has provided us with any argument that the
reciprocity provision is necessary to effectuate some legitimate
local interest.  We thus hold it unconstitutional as violative of
the dormant Commerce Clause.
C.
Finally, plaintiffs seek to invalidate New Jersey’s ban on
direct shipments of wine from any winery, whether in-state or
out-of-state, to consumers.   While plaintiffs concede that this12
own respective business in connection with and as defined in
their respective licenses, without possessing a transportation
license.”  New Jersey winery licenses, however, do not allow
the licensees to transport wine to consumers.  As discussed
above, the plenary winery license permits sales to consumers
only “on the licensed premises of the winery for consumption
on or off the premises” and “in six salesrooms apart from the
winery premises for consumption on or off the premises.”  Id.
§ 33:1-10(2a).  The language of the farm winery provision is
slightly different; it allows sales “at retail to consumers for
consumption on or off the licensed premises” and “in six
salesrooms apart from the winery premises for consumption
on or off the premises.”  Id. § 33:1-10(2b).  Plaintiffs argue
that the first of these phrases allows the shipment of wine to
consumers – essentially reading “on or off the premises” to
apply to the location of the sale, not the location of the
consumption.  But that reading ignores the parallel use of “on
or off the premises” to apply to consumption in both the
plenary license provision and the salesroom portion of the
farm winery license language.  Moreover, if a farm winery
could sell “at retail to consumers” anywhere, the separate
language allowing sales at six salesrooms across the state
would be surplusage.  Accordingly, although the language of
the farm and plenary winery license provisions differs
slightly, we interpret the two types of licenses as providing
identical privileges concerning direct sales to consumers. 
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ban is not facially discriminatory, they argue that it is
discriminatory in effect.  To prevail on this argument, plaintiffs
must “show that the challenged state statute has extraterritorial
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effects that adversely affect economic production (and hence
interstate commerce) in other states, thereby forcing ‘producers
or consumers in other States [to] surrender whatever competitive
advantages they may possess.’”  Cloverland II, 462 F.3d at 261
(quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986)). 
In their attempt to meet this burden, plaintiffs note that
some wineries sell their goods only by direct shipment.  But the
choice by certain producers to conduct sales only by direct
shipment is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the ABC Law,
because the Commerce Clause does not place New Jersey under
an obligation to cater to the preferred marketing practices of out-
of-state businesses.  See A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. N.J. Bureau of
Secs., 163 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that “questions
of the market’s ‘structure’ and its ‘method of operation’ are
quite simply beyond the concern of the Commerce Clause”)
(quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-28
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(1978)). 
Plaintiffs also contend that the direct shipment ban
disproportionately affects out-of-state wineries because those
producers must funnel all of their wine through the three-tier
system.  But, assuming that this requirement disadvantages out-
of-state producers, it is not an effect of the direct-shipment ban
– which even-handedly forces all wine sales out of one channel
and into other available channels – but by the features of the
ABC Law invalidated above, which allow New Jersey wineries
to circumvent the three-tier system.  This argument therefore
also fails to demonstrate that the direct shipment ban is
discriminatory in effect.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that many consumers cannot,
or will not, undertake to travel to distant locations to purchase
wine.  Even if true, this fact, standing alone, does not
demonstrate that the direct shipment ban harms interstate
commerce by privileging in-state producers at the expense of
The Report, “Possible Anticompetitive Barriers13
to E-Commerce: Wine,” is available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf (last visited
July 15, 2010).
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out-of-state wineries.  And while several types of evidence
could show such an effect, plaintiffs have failed to present any
competent evidence that the ban burdens interstate commerce.
The Federal Trade Commission report on which they rely,13
though critical of direct shipment bans, is silent as to the effects
of New Jersey law.  Plaintiffs also have not produced any other
evidence that so much as “a single penny of losses” incurred by
any out-of-state producer is “attributable to the allegedly
discriminatory” ban.  Baldacci, 505 F.3d at 37.  Further,
although the ban might be unconstitutional in its effects if it led
to more New Jersey wines, and fewer out-of-state wines, being
sold in New Jersey, the record reflects that less than 1% of wine
sold in New Jersey is grown in New Jersey – a fact that gives
rise to the inference that no displacement of out-of-state wines
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has occurred.  Plaintiffs have also failed to present evidence that
(1) “consumers substitute wines purchased directly from [in-
state] vineyards for wines that they otherwise would have
purchased from out-of-state producers,” or, in fact, that (2)
anyone besides the Freemans purchases “any wines at all . . .
directly from [in-state] vineyards.”  Id. at 36.  Nor do “plaintiffs
. . . adduce[ any] evidence that would in any way undermine the
plausible impression that” New Jersey “consumers (like
imbibers everywhere) view trips to a winery as a distinct
experience incommensurate with – and therefore, unlikely to be
replaced by – a trip to either a mailbox or a retail liquor store.”
Id. at 37.  In short, the record contains no evidence that New
Jersey’s direct shipment ban harms interstate commerce in favor
of intrastate commerce.  
In fact, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ argument is not that
non-New Jersey wines are excluded from the market, but rather
that a subset of those wines, which are produced by small
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wineries that do not have much volume or perhaps capital,
would only be able to enter the New Jersey market via direct
shipping, which is prohibited.  But, as with wineries that deliver
exclusively by mail order, the fact that consumers cannot obtain
a subset of out-of-state wines because of the otherwise-neutral
structure of the market and the business plans of the wineries in
question does not render New Jersey’s direct-shipment ban
constitutionally infirm.  See A.S. Goldmen & Co., 163 F.3d at
787.  And because plaintiffs bear the burden on this issue, “the
mere fact that a statutory regime has a discriminatory potential
is not enough to trigger strict scrutiny.”  Baldacci, 505 F.3d at
37; see also Ass’d Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 654
(1994) (noting that the Supreme Court has “never deemed a
hypothetical possibility of favoritism to constitute discrimination
that transgresses constitutional commands”).  We accordingly
hold that plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating
that the direct shipment ban discriminates against interstate
We note that the Sixth Circuit, in Cherry Hill14
Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008), struck
down, on an arguably similar record, a Kentucky statutory
provision permitting individuals to receive direct shipments
from small wineries if the consumer had ordered the wine
while physically present at the winery.  The Lilly court’s
holding, however, rested on the conclusion that “small
Kentucky wineries benefit[ted] from less competition from
out-of-state wineries” “[b]ecause of the economic and
logistical barriers caused by the in-person requirement.”  Id. at
433.  No such requirement is present in New Jersey law, and
Lilly is therefore distinguishable.
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commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.14
Because plaintiffs do not argue in the alternative that the
direct shipping ban fails the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), we reject their challenge to
the direct shipping ban and affirm the District Court’s opinion
insofar as it held that ban to be constitutional.
IV.
Having determined that the provisions of the ABC Law
(1) allowing in-state wineries to sell directly to consumers and
retailers, and (2) limiting the importation of out-of-state wine
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intended for personal consumption into New Jersey violate the
dormant Commerce Clause, we turn to the issue of the proper
remedy.  The invalid statutory provisions are constitutionally
underinclusive, in that their provision of privileges to in-state
wineries alone renders them invalid.  This deficiency can be
remedied in one of two ways – either by “declar[ing the
offending provisions] a nullity and order[ing] that [their]
benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to
benefit, or [by] extend[ing] the coverage of the statute to include
those who are aggrieved by the exclusion.”  Heckler v.
Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 (1984).  In this case, neither the
parties nor the District Court has expressly considered the
choice between extension and nullification.  For this reason, and
because the choice between extension and nullification is
“within the constitutional competence of a federal district
court,” id. at 739 n.5, we will remand to the District Court for a
determination of the appropriate remedy.  See also, e.g., SEC v.
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Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1994)
(suggesting remand “[w]hen significant factors” were not
previously “weighed in” choosing a remedy). 
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we (1) affirm the District
Court’s determination that the Freemans have standing to sue,
(2) vacate the District Court’s invalidation of New Jersey’s fee
schedule for retail and wholesale licenses, (3) reverse the
District Court’s determination that the direct sales and
importation provisions of New Jersey law comport with the
dictates of the dormant Commerce Clause, (4) affirm the District
Court’s conclusion that New Jersey’s ban on direct shipments of
wine is constitutional, and (5) remand for a determination of the
proper remedy.
